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NORMATIVE IGNORANCE:
A CRITICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE
INSANITY AND MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSES
KEN M. LEVY*
ABSTRACT

This Article falls into three general parts. The first part starts
with an important question: is the insanity defense constitutionally
required? The United States Supreme Court is currently considering
this question in the case of Kahler v. Kansas.
The Court actually refused to answer this question in 2012 when
it denied certiorarito an appeal brought by John Joseph Delling, a
severely mentally ill defendant who was sentenced to life in prison three
years earlier for two murders. Delling never had the opportunity to
plead the insanity defense because his home state, Idaho, had abolished
it in 1982.
By depriving Delling of the right to plead insanity, Idaho violated
Delling's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his Eighth
Amendment right against "crueland unusual"punishment. Naturally,
the same is true for many other mentally ill and disabled defendants
who have been prosecuted in Idaho and in the other three states that
have abolished the insanity defense: Kansas, Montana, and Utah.
The second general part of this Article notes an insight that I
stumbled upon in the course of researchingthe first part: the insanity
defense and the mistake of law defense both require ignorance of the
law, what I refer to as "normative ignorance." Indeed, normative
ignorance is what makes both of these defenses exculpatory in the first
place.
Given this critical connection, there is a way for Idaho, Kansas,
Montana, and Utah to resume compliance with the Constitution.
Instead of reinstating the insanity defense per se, which might be
politically unpopular, they should just broaden their mistake of law
defense to include normative ignorance caused by cognitive incapacity
that is itself caused by mental illness or disability.
Still, this Article is not merely directed at these four western states.
It is directed at the other forty-six states as well. Because they already
* Holt B. Harrison Professor, Louisiana State University Law School. I would like to
thank Elisabeth Avilla for helping to improve the quality of this article; Russell Christopher
for his very detailed feedback on an earlier draft; Eric Chaffee for patiently answering my
questions about insider trading; and the following for their very helpful questions and suggestions: Eric Berger, Richard Bierschbach, Raff Donelson, Stuart Green, Andrea Kolich,
Stephen Rushin, Katie Stauss, and the participants at Loyola Chicago Law School's Ninth
Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium (Nov. 2, 2018), a panel discussion about insider trading at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) Conference (Aug. 9, 2018),
Barry University ACS Constitutional Law Scholars Forum (Mar. 2, 2018), and the Louisiana
Scholarly Workshop (Feb. 23, 2018).
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have an insanity defense, they need not incorporateit into their mistake
of law defense. But in the third general part, I will argue that they
should still expand their mistake of law defense to cover defendants
who either lack a reasonableopportunity to learn the law or reasonably
but mistakenly infer from widely accepted norms or ethics that their
conduct is lawful.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1979 and 1995, four states-Idaho,' Kansas,2 Montana, 3
and Utah 4-abolished the insanity defense. 5 One question that the
1. State v. Fisher, 398 P.3d 839, 841 (Idaho 2017) ("In 1982, the Idaho legislature repealed former Idaho Code section 18-209, which made mental disease or defect an affirmative defense in a criminal proceeding.").
2. State v. Van Hoet, 89 P.3d 606, 613 (Kan. 2004) ("In 1995, the Kansas Legislature
amended [K.S.A. 22-3428] to abolish the defense of insanity and replace it with a mental
disease or defect defense.").
3. State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 996 (Mont. 1984) ("In 1979 the Forty-Sixth Session of
the Montana Legislature enacted House Bill 877. This Bill abolished use of the traditional
insanity defense in Montana and substituted alternative procedures for considering a criminal defendant's mental condition.")
4. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 361 (Utah 1995) ("When John Hinckley was found
not guilty by reason of insanity for shooting President Ronald Reagan and Press Secretary
James Brady, public outrage prompted Congress and some states to reexamine their respective insanity defense laws. As a result, in 1983 Utah abolished the traditional insanity defense in favor of a new statutory scheme.").
5. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy, Insanity Defenses, in THE OXFORD
&

HANDBOOK ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 299, 316-17, 320-21, 324 (John Deigh

David Dolinko eds., 2011).
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United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed is whether
such abolition is constitutional-specifically, whether it violates either
the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of due process for criminal
defendants 6 or the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel
and unusual" punishment.7 Fortunately, however, the Court is now
addressing this question in Kahler v. Kansas.8
The primary purpose of the insanity defense is to prevent
injustice. 9 A person who suffers from a serious mental illness or
disability that undermines her rationality or self-control is no more
responsible for her criminal act than a young child or animal
would be and therefore cannot justly be punished for committing it.
The two underlying assumptions here are that insanity negates
responsibility and responsibility is a necessary condition of just
punishment. 10 Whether, then, the insanity defense is constitutionally
required depends on whether both of these assumptions are
represented in the Constitution.
One problem is that the Constitution does not explicitly state these
assumptions. It does not even mention the words "responsible" or
"responsibility." So on a purely textualist interpretation of both the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments," the abolition of the insanity
defense is constitutional.
Abolitionists might further argue that even if a non-textualist
theory of interpretation were applied to the Eighth and Fourteenth

6.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§1

("No state shall ...

deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law .... ").

7.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").

8. Kahler v. Kansas, 410 P.3d 105 (Kan. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019).
9. See Foucha u. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("As Foucha was not convicted, he
may not be punished. Here, Louisiana has by reason of his acquittal exempted Foucha from
criminal responsibility as [Louisiana's insanity statute] requires." (citations omitted));
Grant H. Morris, Placed in Purgatory:Conditional Release of Insanity Acquittees, 39 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1061, 1113 (1997) ("As we approach the new millennium, a frightened public's cry
for vengeance is deafening. Insanity acquittees, however, are not criminally responsible and
may not be punished."); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 827 (1985) ("We should be clear that it is unjust to punish
someone who is not responsible. The argument that insanity acquittees who are released

early do not receive their just deserts is simply illogical and improper because nonresponsible persons do not deserve to be punished.").
10. See Ken M. Levy, Free Will, Responsibility, and Crime: An Introduction 111 (2020)
("Underlying the insanity defense are three assumptions: (a) people who are insane are not
morally responsible for their actions, (b) moral responsibility is a necessary condition of
criminal responsibility, and (c) criminal responsibility is necessary for just criminal punishment. Therefore, by transitivity, people who are insane may not be justly criminally punished.").
11. See Ken Levy, Why the Late Justice Scalia Was Wrong: The Fallaciesof Constitutional Textualism, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45, 47 (2017) (" 'Constitutional Textualism'more commonly referred to as just 'Textualism'-[is] Justice Scalia's (and many of his followers') theory that the meaning of the Constitution lies entirely in its words.").
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Amendments, and even if this interpretation entailed that the
insanity defense is constitutionally required, abolition would still
be constitutional as long as the state provided an adequate substitute
for the insanity defense. And, they argue, this is precisely what the
four abolitionist states did. All of them replaced their insanity defense
with a diminished capacity defense.1 2
While the insanity defense says that the defendant's mental
illness or disability is so debilitating that it is fully exculpatorythat is, fully negates responsibility for her crime-the diminished
capacity defense says that the defendant's mental illness or disability
is not fully exculpatory.1 3 Instead, it negates only the defendant's
capacity to form the mens rea, usually specific intent or knowledge,
required for the offense. 4 But the result is not therefore acquittal;
instead, it is mitigation to a lesser crime, a crime whose mens rea is
not negated by the defendant's diminished capacity-for example,
manslaughter instead of murder. 5
Unfortunately, however, the diminished capacity defense is a
constitutionally (and morally) inadequate substitute for the insanity
defense. Most defendants who would otherwise qualify as insane are
perfectly capable of forming the mens rea required for the crime with
which they are charged. As a result, if they are afforded only the
diminished capacity defense, they are being effectively deprived of
both their constitutional right to due process, which includes the
right to offer a fully exculpatory defense against criminal charges, and
(if convicted and punished) their Eighth Amendment right against
cruel and unusual punishment. 6

12. See IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (2011); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-14-102 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (West 2016).
13.

See MICHAEL N.

GIULIANO ET AL., 22

C.J.S.

CRIMINAL LAW:

SUBSTANTIVE

PRINCIPLES § 128 (Sept. 2019) ("The defense of insanity requires absolute inability, whereas
the mitigating factor of diminished capacity only requires the lack of substantial capacity.").
But see Carissa Byrne Hessick & Douglas A. Berman, Towards a Theory of Mitigation, 96

B.U. L. REV. 161, 175 (2016) ("[T]here is uncertainty about whether diminished capacity
ought to be treated as a mitigating factor. Diminished capacity is a cognitive or psychological
defect that limits a person's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of her crimes or her ability
to avoid committing them. On the one hand, diminished capacity should be treated as a

mitigating factor because it lessens a defendant's culpability. On the other hand, it should
be treated as an aggravating factor because diminished capacity makes the defendant more
likely to commit crimes in the future.").
14.

See GIULIANO ET AL., supra note 13,

§

128.

15. Id.
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 304 (2002) (holding that execution of the mentally disabled constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 399, 401 (1986) (holding that executing insane individuals is cruel and unusual punishment).
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It follows that the insanity defense is constitutionally required"
and therefore that Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Utah have been
violating the Constitution for the past few decades. So they should
reinstate it as soon as possible. And if these four states are worried
about political resistance, I offer a solution: sneak a version of the
insanity defense into their mistake of law defense. I also propose two
other additions to the mistake of law defense: lack of a reasonable
opportunity to learn the law and a reasonable but mistaken inference
from widely accepted norms or ethics that one's conduct is lawful.
At first, my solution (sneaking the insanity defense into the
mistake of law defense) may seem preposterous; criminal law scholars
will understandably ask what one defense has to do with the other. It
turns out that the two defenses, which are normally regarded as
entirely distinct and unrelated, are actually very closely connected.
Specifically, they overlap in one critical respect: what makes both
excuses excuses is that they both involve what I dub "normative
ignorance," the kind of moral or legal ignorance that an individual
must suffer at the time of her crime in order to be eligible for the
insanity defense. While the mistake of law defense says that a
defendant should be excused from criminal wrongdoing because
18
she honestly and reasonably believed that her conduct was legal,
the insanity defense says that a defendant should be excused
from criminal wrongdoing because her mental illness or disability
prevented her from knowing or understanding the law. 19

II.

DELLING V. IDAHO

The U.S. Supreme Court has never decided whether the insanity
defense is constitutionally required, but it did come close. In Delling v.

17. See, e.g., State v. Lange, 123 So. 639, 642 (La. 1929); Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581,
581-82 (Miss. 1931); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 66, 68 (Nev. 2001); State v. Strasburg, 110
P. 1020, 1021, 1024 (Wash. 1910).
18. See Ken Levy, It's Not Too Difficult: A Plea to Resurrect the Impossibility Defense,
45 N.M. L. REV. 225, 243 (2014) ("Normally, ignorance of the law is no excuse. But ignorance
of the law can be an excuse when the ignorance is honest and reasonable." (emphasis omitted)).
19. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800 (1952) ("Knowledge of right and wrong is
the exclusive test of criminal responsibility in a majority of American jurisdictions."). It
should be mentioned that the insanity defense does not always involve normative ignorance;

occasionally it involves factual ignorance. On the M'Naghten Rule insanity may involve ignorance of the the nature and quality of the act as a result of a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind. Infra Part IV. Because most successful pleas of the insanity defense involve
normative ignorance rather than factual ignorance-which would explain why the highly
influential Model Penal Code simply eliminated factual ignorance from its definition of insanity-this exception should not disrupt my analysis. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1)
(AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
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Idaho,20 John Joseph Delling argued that Idaho had deprived him of
his constitutional right to present an insanity defense. For better or
worse, the Court denied certiorari. 2 1
Still, Justice Breyer issued a dissent from the denial of certiorari
that Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. In his dissent, Justice
Breyer argued that the Constitution does indeed require the fifty
states to provide an insanity defense. 22 Justice Breyer's central
argument involved a comparison between two situations, which he
referred to as "Case One" and "Case Two."2
In Case One, "The defendant, due to insanity, believes that the
victim is a wolf. He shoots and kills the victim."24 In Case Two, "The
defendant, due to insanity, believes that a wolf, a supernatural figure,
has ordered him to kill the victim."2 5 Neither defendant seems guilty
of murder. The defendant in Case One does not seem guilty of murder
because, as a result of his insanity, he did not intend to kill a human
being. The defendant in Case Two does not seem guilty of murder
because, as a result of his insanity, his reason for killing another
human being was delusional.
The problem is that a state that recognized only the diminished
capacity defense and not the insanity defense would be forced to reach
unjust results. Specifically, the State would have to acquit only the
defendant in Case One, not the defendant in Case Two, because only
the defendant in Case One lacked the requisite mens rea for murder
(intentionally killing another human being). 26 For this reason, the
defendant in Case Two would suffer a serious injustice; he would be
convicted of a crime, whether second degree murder or manslaughter,
when he was not, in fact, responsible for it.
Actually, it is more precise to say that the Case One defendant
would suffer less injustice, as opposed to no injustice. Diminished
capacity is generally considered to be only a mitigating factor, not
a full excuse like insanity.2" So if the Case One defendant, who is
deprived of the insanity defense, is acquitted of murder on the basis
of diminished capacity, he will still most likely be convicted of a
lesser crime, like manslaughter or negligent homicide. And because,
ex hypothesi, the Case One defendant is insane, this result is still
unjust-only less unjust than if he had been convicted of murder, as
the Case Two defendant would be.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Delling v. State, 267 P.3d 709, 711 (Idaho 2011), cert denied, 568 U.S. 1038 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1040.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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III. WHY DIMINISHED CAPACITY IS NOT AN
ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE INSANITY DEFENSE

Once we dig a little deeper into Justice Breyer's Case One/Case
Two argument, we can better understand why the diminished capacity
defense is an inadequate substitute for the insanity defense.
Some background is necessary. The two main types of defenses are
justifications and excuses.2 8 A justification says that the apparent
crime (for example, murder) was not, in fact, a crime; once the full
context is considered, the surface-level appearance turns out to be
quite distinct from reality. 29 For example, while a killing may initially
appear to be a murder, this appearance would be false if the defendant
were engaging in (perfect) self-defense or defense of others. So it would
be completely unjust to convict and punish him.
An excuse, on the other hand, says that the defendant did indeed
commit the crime but cannot justly be blamed for it because she could
not reasonably have been expected, given particular circumstances,
to have avoided it. 30 There are several circumstances that qualify:
involuntariness (the automatism defense), entrapment, severe mental
illness or disability (the insanity defense), serious threats (the duress
defense), youth (the infancy defense), involuntary intoxication,
mistake of fact, and mistake of law.31 Each of these circumstances
would make blaming and punishing the defendant for a given criminal
32
act (much) more unjust than acquitting her.
Underlying both justifications and excuses is the "Responsibility
Axiom": even if a defendant commits an act that satisfies all the
elements of a crime, the circumstances surrounding the act would
make it more unjust to hold her responsible-that is, to blame and

28. See David 0. Brink, The Nature and Significanceof Culpability, 13 CRIM. L. & PHIL.
347, 353 (2019) ("[T]he two main kinds of affirmative defense a defendant can offer [are]
justifications and excuses.").
29.

See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (2000) ("Claims of justi-

fication concede that the definition of the offense is satisfied, but challenge whether the act
is wrongful; . . . . A justification speaks to the rightness of the act .... ").

30.

See LEVY, supra note 10, at 139 ("[W]hat ties all of the currently recognized excuses

together is not the defendant's normative incompetence (or hard choice) but society's normative expectations. They all point to conditions or circumstances that make it unreasonable

for society to expect the defendant to have behaved otherwise-that is, to have avoided committing the criminal act that she committed."); cf. FLETCHER, supra note 29, at 759
("[C]laims of excuse concede that the act is wrongful, but seek to avoid the attribution of the
act to the actor. . . . [A]n excuse, [speaks] to whether the actor is accountable for a concededly
wrongful act.").
31. See LEVY, supra note 10, at 35, 136, 140.
32. See id. at 139-40 ("[T]he excuses as a whole embody this fundamental point: it is
more just that we refrain from punishing somebody whom we cannot reasonably expect to
have avoided committing a crime than that we simply vent our perfectly natural and understandable punitive impulses against her for committing this crime.").
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punish her-for committing this act than to acquit her.3 3 In the
criminal justice system, the Responsibility Axiom is foundational.
Causal responsibility for a crime is simply insufficient; the defendant
must be morally responsible for the crime as well.34 And moral
responsibility means not merely satisfying all of the elements of
the crime (as defined in the statutes) but also failing to satisfy
circumstances that would render performance of the crime reasonable,
understandable, or unavoidable."
There are two reasons to think that the diminished capacity defense
sometimes conflicts with the Responsibility Axiom. First, diminished
capacity is merely mitigating, not fully exculpatory (like the insanity
defense); 36 it merely reduces the crime charged or the sentence. So the
defendant is still being blamed and punished, just to a lesser degree.
And blame and punishment to any degree is unjust if the defendant
was not at all responsible for her crime, which is the case if she was
insane. As Justice Breyer argued in the Delling v. Idaho dissent, such
undeserved punishment is cruel and unusual. 37
Second, the diminished capacity defense often does not "scratch"
where it "itches." Again, the diminished capacity defense says that
the defendant was, for some reason, unable to form the mens rea
required for the crime charged. But, as in Justice Breyer's Case Two
example, the defendant was able to form the mens rea-in that case,
intentionally killing another human being. So it is simply wronga factual mistake-to find him eligible for the diminished capacity
defense. Of course, many defendants are entitled to mitigation
rather than full exculpation. But the reason for mitigation should be
accurately captured by the defense. In Case Two, it is not. By
preventing the defendant from offering a more accurate defense of his
criminal act, the state is depriving him of fundamental due process.

33. See id. at 57 ("It is a foundational axiom of criminal law-call it the 'Responsibility
Axiom'-that criminal punishment requires or presupposes responsibility."); id. at 136
("Criminal responsibility, and therefore just criminal punishment, are almost universally
thought to require moral responsibility.").

34. See Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 754 (2012) ("Convicting a morally blameless party
... brings the criminal justice system into disrepute and dilutes the effect of society's communal condemnation of his actions."); id. at 768 ("[I]mprisoning a person who is morally
blameless not only violates longstanding principles of fairness, not only engenders disrespect
for the criminal law, and not only fails to promote the retributive or deterrent purposes of

the criminal law, but it also creates a risk of a haphazard or lottery-like system of enforcement .... "). But see LEVY, supra note 10, at 119-25, 145-52 (arguing that criminal responsibility does not require moral responsibility).
35. See LEVY, supra note 10, at 34-35, 104-10 (discussing the four conditions or elements of moral responsibility).
36. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
37. See Delling v. State, 267 P.3d 709, 711 (Idaho 2011), cert denied, 568 U.S. 1038,
1040 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting on the denial of certiorari).
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IV. NORMATIVE IGNORANCE:
THE CRITICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE
INSANITY AND MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSES

While Part III may seem to lead directly to the conclusion that the
insanity defense is constitutionally required, I will argue in this Part
that this conclusion does not follow. As long as a jurisdiction provides
for both a diminished capacity defense and a broad mistake of law
defense, it need not also provide for an insanity defense per se. But to
get to this conclusion, I first need to explain what the insanity defense
is all about.
The two main versions of the insanity defense are the M'Naghten
Rule and the Model Penal Code (MPC) rule.38 According to the former,
insanity consists of three elements:
(1) a mental illness or disability
(2) causes
(3) the individual to lack knowledge either
(3a) of the nature of his criminal act or
(3b) that his criminal act is wrong. 39
According to the latter, insanity consists of three elements:
(1) a mental illness or disability
(2) causes
(4) the individual to "lack [the] substantial capacity" either
(4a) "to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his
conduct" or
(4b) "to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law."40

While (1) and (2) are identical for both definitions, (3) in the
M'Naghten Rule and (4) in the MPC Rule are not. Still, (3) and
(4a) both concern the insane individual's ignorance. While (3) more
narrowly concerns the individual's inability to acquire cognitive
knowledge that the act is wrong, (4a) more broadly captures
the individual's inability to acquire a cognitive or emotional
understanding of why the act is wrong.41
38. See LEVY, supra note 10, at 112-13.
39. See LEVY, supra note 10, at 112 (citing M'Naghten's Case, [1843] 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(H.L. 722)).
40. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985); LEVY, supra note 10, at 112-13 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW
INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)).
41. I will briefly discuss (4a)-that is, the volitional prong of the insanity defense-in
Section X. For a fuller discussion of the volitional prong, see LEVY, supranote 10, at 61, 11213, 117; Sinnott-Armstrong & Levy, supra note 5, at 306-12.
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Let's use the term "normative ignorance" to capture the legal
ignorance that an individual must suffer at the time of her crime in
order to be eligible for the insanity defense. By "legal ignorance," I
mean ignorance not just of particular statutes and common law but
also of natural law or commonly accepted morality, which informs and
motivates many criminal laws. What very few realize is that this
normative ignorance is precisely what the mistake of law defense is all
about as well. So the insanity defense and the mistake of law defense
intersect in a surprising, intriguing way.42 I will use this point of
intersection to argue that the mistake of law defense may serve as an
adequate substitute for the insanity defense.
Suppose that Clyde suffers from paranoid delusions and murders
Bonnie in Kansas, a jurisdiction that has abolished the insanity
defense, because he believes that Bonnie is the devil. The diminished
capacity defense, which is only mitigating, applies if Clyde was unable
to form the mens rea required for murder. In Kansas, the required
mens rea for first degree murder is intent plus premeditation.43
Clearly, Clyde was able to form this mens rea; he was able to
premeditate Bonnie's death and then act on this premeditation."
Given Kansas' abolition of the insanity defense in 1995, diminished
capacity is the best defense available to Clyde. But what if he pleaded
the mistake of law defense instead? What if he argued that, because of
his mental illness or disability, he lacked the ability to know that, or
appreciate why, killing another human being, no matter how evil he
believes her to be, is a serious violation of Kansas's criminal law?
Would this mistake of law defense serve just as well as the insanity
defense?
We simply do not know how a typical Kansas jury would receive the
mistake of law defense in this situation. But, first, there is no reason
to think that they would be any less receptive to it than they would be
if Clyde had pleaded insanity, were the insanity defense still available.
Second, even if the jury were less receptive to the mistake of law
defense in this context, he would still be receiving full due process,
which is what really matters here. Kansas' severely mentally ill
defendants deserve due process just as much as all other defendants.
And if Kansan legislators are worried, correctly or not, that reinstating
the insanity defense would be politically unpopular, my suggestion
here is that they could minimize political damage simply by inserting

42.

Doug Husak also recognizes this point of intersection. DOUGLAS HUSAK, IGNORANCE

OF LAw: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 87 (2016).

43. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5402 (2019).
44. See State v. Cowan, 861 P.2d 884, 887 (Mont. 1993) ("The existence of a mental
disease or defect in a person does not necessarily preclude the person from acting purposely
or knowingly.").
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it into a broadened mistake of law statute, which-because of its less
sensational, more recondite nature-is much less likely to arouse the
public's hostility.
V. THE MAIN RATIONALE FOR
THE MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSE:
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIRES
KNOWLEDGE OF CRIMINAL LAW

My central thesis is that an expanded mistake of law defense can
adequately substitute for the insanity defense. But why think that the mistake
of law defense has any validity in the first place?
Suppose four things. First, the government passes a particular lawL-prohibiting a particular act--A-and prescribes a certain range of
punishment for individuals who perform A. Second, an individualagain, Clyde-intentionally performs A. Third, Clyde claims that he never
knew or heard about L. His claim is not that the prosecution or the government
is violating the legality principle, which "forbids punishing an individual for
committing an act that the state had not designated as criminal at the time that
the individual performed the act." 4 The government did, after all, announce
the passage of L. Instead, his claim is that, even if this is true, he never
received this information and therefore cannot be blamed and punished for
performing A. Fourth, we have proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Clyde is
not lying about his ignorance of L at the time that he A-ed.
This is a strange situation. On the one hand, (a) Clyde satisfies all of t
he elements of the crime. Again, he knowingly and intentionally A-ed. On
the other hand, (b) he is making a very plausible claim that he is still not
responsible for the crime. The reason: while he knowingly A-ed, he did not
know that A-ing was illegal.
Together, (a) and (b) raise some difficult questions. Is mere knowledge of
the facts, especially what action one is performing and what harms it will
cause, sufficient for criminal culpability? 46 Or is the additional knowledge
that the action itself is criminal also necessary? How can Clyde think that,

45. Levy, supra note 18, at 230-31.
46. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 11 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) ("[T]he conventional position [is] that knowledge of the existence, meaning
or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is not an element of that
offense . . . . The proper arena for the principle that ignorance or mistake of law does not
afford an excuse is thus with respect to the particular law that sets forth the definition of
the crime in question. It is knowledge of that law that is normally not a part of the crime,
and it is ignorance or mistake as to that law that is denied defensive significance . . . by the
traditional common law approach to the issue."); Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A
Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 671, 683 (1976) ("At common law, the mens rea
necessary to convict generally required that the government show the defendant to have
acted purposefully to bring about a harm, to have known facts indicating that the harm
would be a likely result of his action, or to have acted without concern for whether the harm
would follow.").
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despite his commission of the crime, it is still unjust to punish him for it?
More specifically, why does Clyde think that his ignorance of the law excuses
him? What exactly seems exculpatory about his ignorance? Conversely, why
think that criminal culpability requires knowledge of the law?
Clyde's response to these questions is that he is blameless for the same
reason that he would have been blameless had the government never passed
L to begin with. If L had not passed before Clyde A-ed, then punishing Clyde
for A-ing would be wrong because he never received fair notice that L was
prohibited.47 But, ex hypothesi, Clyde never did receive fair notice of the fact
that L passed.
So it would be equally unjust to blame and punish Clyde. 48 The two
situations are subjectively identical. And it is this subjective state, specifically
his state of mind at the time he performed A, that determines whether he is
culpable for A-ing.

47. See C. Antoinette Clarke, Law and Order on the Courts: The Application of Criminal Liability for Intentional Fouls DuringSporting Events, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1149, 1182-83
(2000) ("By restricting punishment to the violation of existing legal rules, the principle of
legality promotes fair notice, which in turn facilitates individual autonomy. By denying officials the discretion to punish conduct that the officials-but not any existing law--deem
criminal, it assures that society is governed by the rule of law rather than the will of men.
One of the rationales advanced for the legality principles and related doctrines is 'the perceived unfairness of punishing conduct not previously defined as criminal.' . . . This notice
or fair warning is considered essential to fundamental fairness." (citations omitted)); Levy,
supra note 18, at 230-31 ("The principle of legality forbids punishing an individual for committing an act that the state had not designated as criminal at the time that the individual
performed the act.").
48. See Stephen P. Garvey, Authority, Ignorance, and the Guilty Mind, 67 SMU L. REV.
545, 547-48 (2014) ("An actor possesses a guilty mind if and only if he freely chooses to (p,
where <p-ing is contrary to the demands of the criminal law, and where the actor's choice to
p manifests a quality of will inconsistent with that of a law-abiding citizen. Unless an actor
freely decides to (p with a guilty mind the state cannot legitimately find him guilty of criminal
wrongdoing. Absent such a finding, the state has no permission to subject him to the criminal law's repertoire of responses, not the least of which is punishment." (citations omitted));
Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 762 ("[W]here the law forbids conduct that [is not injurious, dangerous, or wrongful] . . . it is no less unfair to impose a criminal sanction upon a

party who reasonably, albeit mistakenly, believes that his conduct is lawful than it is to
punish someone whose conduct violates an unduly vague statute. Neither party has the evil
or nefarious intent that is the hallmark of culpability and that the criminal law seeks to
curb, so neither person should be subject to condemnation and sanction. Neither one purposefully chose to break a known law because neither one knew what the law in fact prohibited. Neither one, therefore, deserves to be criminally punished."); Herbert L. Packer, Mens
Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 123-24 (1962) ("If a man does an act
under circumstances that make the act criminal, but he is unaware of those circumstances,
surely he has not had fair warning that his conduct is criminal..... [I]f he is unaware that

his conduct is labeled as criminal by a statute, is he not in much the same position as one
who is convicted under a statute which is too vague to give 'fair warning'? In both cases, the
defendant is by hypothesis unblameworthy in that he has acted without advertence or negligent inadvertence to the possibility that his conduct might be criminal. If warning to the
prospective defendant is really the thrust of the vagueness doctrine, then it seems inescapable that disturbing questions are raised . . . about the whole range of criminal liabilities
that are upheld despite the defendant's plea of ignorance of the law.").
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Clyde's claim is that criminal responsibility requires not just satisfaction
of the mens rea for L, whatever that may be: intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly A-ing. It also requires knowledge that A-ing is indeed illegal. So if
Clyde did not know about L, and if his ignorance of L was not deliberate or
willful, 49 then he cannot justly be held responsible for violating it."0 And the
reason, once again, is that it is unjust to blame and punish somebody for
committing an act that he did not know was prohibited."
49. Willful ignorance (or willful blindness or conscious avoidance), which involves (a)
knowledge of a high probability that one's conduct is illegal, and (b) deliberate efforts to
avoid confirmation of this knowledge, is considered to be sufficient for knowledge. GlobalTech Appliances v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011); United States v. Giovannetti, 919
F.2d 1223, 1226 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1976).
50. Consider another example: conspiracy. Conspiracy requires three mens reas
(mentes reae): an intention to enter into an agreement, knowledge that the agreement involves illegal objectives, and an intention that these illegal objectives be realized. See, e.g.,
DirectSales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943) ("[The] intent [to further, promote,
and cooperate in an illegal act] . . . is the gist of conspiracy. While it is not identical with
mere knowledge that another purposes unlawful action, it is not unrelated to such
knowledge. Without the knowledge, the intent cannot exist."). But what if a person intentionally enters into an agreement, knows the objectives of the agreement, intends to realize
these objectives, does not know that the objectives are illegal, and her ignorance of the illegality of the objectives is not deliberate or willful? Is she still guilty of conspiracy? The Supreme Court has stated that knowledge of illegality is not necessary for culpability. See
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 687 (1975) ("The general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 371, offers no textual support for the proposition that to be guilty of conspiracy a defendant
in effect must have known that his conduct violated federal law." (footnote omitted)); Ingram
v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1959) ("It is fundamental that a conviction for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 cannot be sustained unless there is 'proof of an agreement
to commit an offense against the United States.' There need not, of course, be proof that the
conspirators were aware of the criminality of their objective, ... " (citation omitted)); see also
United States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 1023 (11th Cir. 2008) ("The defendant need not know
that the conduct is unlawful, but the conspirators must agree to commit unlawful conduct."
(citing Feola, 420 U.S. at 687)); State v. Peterson, No. 40550, 2014 WL 6092420, at *3 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2014) ("For example, a person is guilty of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance under Idaho Code section 37-2732(f) when she and another person agree to deliver a
controlled substance. The statute does not require the State to prove that the defendant
knew it was illegal to deliver a controlled substance. Under this analysis, then, to be convicted of conspiracy, a defendant must have simply intended to engage in the acts necessary
to commit the underlying substantive offense. Thus, whether the defendant knows the acts
are illegal is irrelevant."). But see People v. Meneses, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 100, 113 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) ("Ignorance that a penal law prohibits one's conduct may ... provide a defense where
one is charged with conspiracy to commit a crime that is not malum in se."); People v. Urziceanu, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) ("Defendant's good faith mistake of law,
while not a defense to the crime of selling marijuana, was a defense to the conspiracy to
commit that crime.").
51. See FLETCHER, supra note 29, at 732 ("Assuming that everyone who violates the
law does so in disregard and disrespect of the law is obviously outdated. Maintaining that
policy today verges on blindness to the problem of individual justice."); Meese & Larkin,
supra note 34, at 764 ("[I]t is fundamentally unfair to punish someone who acted without
knowledge that his conduct was illegal or inherently wrongful. That is, uncritically applying
the common law ignorance rule today often can lead to results that are unjust. . . . Unjust,
because imposing the stigma of a criminal conviction and allied punishments on someone
morally blameless cannot be justified on retributive grounds. A person unaware of what the
law forbids or what custom deems blameworthy by definition harbors neither ill intent nor
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VI. WILLFULNESS
Not everybody agrees with Clyde that knowledge of illegality is
necessary for criminal culpability. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
stated on several occasions that it is not necessary.5 2
One argument against Clyde involves the concept of willfulness.
Some white-collar criminal statutes require willfulness, usually in
addition to intent, for culpability. Courts generally interpret
willfulness to mean knowledge that one's act is illegal. 3 But given
this general interpretation, it would seem to follow that criminal
statutes which omit the willfulness requirement do not require
knowledge that one's act is illegal. If the legislatures wanted this
"knowledge-of-illegality"-as opposed to just "knowledge-of-act-andconsequent-harms"-element in addition to the other applicable
mens rea(s), they would have included it.

any purpose to violate a known legal duty." (footnotes omitted)); id. at 783-84 ("The proposition that a defendant should be able to raise a mistake of law defense to a charge that he
committed a malum prohibitum crime sensibly balances society's strong interest in enforce-

ment of the law and society's even more powerful interest in not punishing morally blameless parties. Allowing the courts to filter out the phony from legitimate claims of mistake

will separate the blameworthy from the blameless and protect the latter. The cost of making
that distinction likely will prove minimal and, in any event, is worth it. Punishing someone
who is blameless is unjust, and that cost must be weighed, too."). But see JEROME HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 38 -83 (2d ed. 1960) ("If [the mistake of law defense]
were valid, the consequence would be: whenever a defendant in a criminal case thought the

law was thus and so, he is to be treated as though the law were thus and so, i.e., the law
actually is thus and so. But such a doctrine would contradict the essential requisites of a
legal system.").
52. See supra note 50; see also Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998) ("[I]n
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), we held that a charge that the defendant's
possession of an unregistered machinegun was unlawful required proof 'that he knew the
weapon he possessed had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition
of a machinegun.' It was not, however, necessary to prove that the defendant knew that his
possession was unlawful. Thus, unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the
term 'knowingly' merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."
(footnote and citations omitted)); see also Paul Savoy, Reopening Ferguson and Rethinking
Civil Rights Prosecutions,41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 277, 314 (2017) ("[C]riminality
requires a culpable state of mind known as mens rea or 'guilty mind.' This does not mean,
however, that a defendant must have known that his conduct was illegal for him to be found
guilty. It is generally sufficient to prove that the defendant intentionally or knowingly inflicted harm on the victim, even if the defendant did not know that doing so was unlawful."
(footnotes omitted)).
53. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191-92 ("As a general matter, when used in the criminal
context, a 'willful' act is one undertaken with a 'bad purpose.' In other words, in order to
establish a 'willful' violation of a statute, 'the Government must prove that the defendant
acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.'" (footnote omitted) (citing Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994))). But see id. at 198-99 ("[W]hile disregard of a
known legal obligation is certainly sufficient to establish a willful violation, it is not necessary. . . ."); Meese & Larkin, supranote 34, at 773 ("[T]he courts could require the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew that his conduct was illegal or at least blameworthy.
That result, while unusual, is not unheard of. The Supreme Court generally has read federal
statutes to require the government to prove that the defendant purposefully broke the law
whenever it forbids conduct that is done 'willfully.' ").
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While initially persuasive, this objection fails. Willfulness has been
inserted into only a relatively small number of criminal statutes,
and-as stated above-these statutes all fall into the area of whitecollar crime. 4 The absence of this mens rea from all other (non-whitecollar) statutes does not necessarily imply that these statutes do not
require knowledge of illegality. Instead, as Clyde argues, this requirement is generally implicit; willfulness is merely added to some of
the more complicated crimes, generally malum prohibitum rather
than malum in se, in order to make this normally implicit requirement
explicit.55
VII. WHY IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW IS GENERALLY No EXCUSE

If Clyde is right and knowledge of the law is necessary for culpability, it would seem to follow that ignorance of the law is an excellent
defense. But then how do we square this inference with the well-known
maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse? 56
54. See Savoy, supra note 52, at 314-15. ("Another exception, which excuses even an
unreasonable mistake of law, has been recognized in a relatively small but growing number
of cases where federal criminal statutes that use the term 'willfully' have been construed to
manifest a congressional intent to require proof that the defendant knew he was acting unlawfully. However, these cases have been confined to tax laws and to regulatory statutes
prohibiting conduct not generally known to be criminal.").
55. See id. at 315 ("The rationale for requiring knowledge of illegality in federal tax
cases has been based on the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code, which has the potential for criminalizing the errors of 'the well-meaning, but easily confused mass of taxpayers.'
Other cases construing willfulness to require consciousness of wrongdoing have expressed a
concern with criminalizing conduct that is 'apparently innocent' or 'not inevitably nefarious,'
like the unauthorized possession of food stamps or the 'structuring' of banking transactions
by making cash deposits in amounts of less than 10,000 dollars to avoid bank reporting requirements." (footnotes omitted)). But see Meese III & Larkin, Jr., supra note 34, at 773
("The Court reads statutes literally and has been unwilling to construe them to include additional elements not found in the text of the law. The Court, therefore, is unlikely to read a
statute as requiring proof of purposeful illegality if the text of the law lacks the term 'willfully.'" (footnote omitted)).
56. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) ("The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in
the American legal system. Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the
common law presumed that every person knew the law." (citations omitted)); United States
v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971) ("The principle that ignorance of
the law is no defense applies whether the law be a statute or a duly promulgated and published regulation."); Sheulin-CarpenterCo. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910) ("[I]nnocence
cannot be asserted of an action which violates existing law, and ignorance of the law will not
excuse."); Utermehle v. Norment, 197 U.S. 40, 55 (1905) ("We know of no case where mere
ignorance of the law, standing alone, constitutes any excuse or defense against its enforcement. It would be impossible to administer the law if ignorance of its provisions were a defense thereto."); United States v. Hodson, 77 U.S. 395, 409 (1870) ("Every one is presumed
to know the law. Ignorance standing alone can never be the basis of a legal right."); Barlow
v. United States, 32 U.S. 404, 411 (1833) ("It is a common maxim, familiar to all minds, that
ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally .... "); United
States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 218 (6th Cir. 1999) ("'[I]gnorance of the law is no excuse.' This
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There are three main explanations for the maxim. First, there is
an obvious policy reason against recognizing ignorance of the law
as an excuse: individuals would be disincentivized to learn the law. 7
Obviously, we want just the opposite: to incentivize knowledge of, and
thereby compliance with, the law. 58
Second, many defendants would plead the mistake of law defense
even though they were aware of the law. In other words, many
defendants would lie. And because it is usually difficult to prove
otherwise-that is, to prove that they did, in fact, know the lawtoo many defendants would escape accountability and punishment
maxim, deeply embedded in our American legal tradition, reflects a presumption that citizens know the requirements of the law."); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE

LAWS OF ENGLAND 27 (1769) ("For a mistake in point of law, which every person of discretion
not only may, but is bound and presumed to know, is in criminal cases no sort of defence.
Ignorantiajuris, quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat, is as well the maxim of our
own law, as it was of the Roman." (footnotes omitted)); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Taking Mistakes
Seriously, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 71, 73 (2013) ("It is settled law that no one can defend against
a criminal charge on the grounds that he did not intend to flout the law and, at worst, made
only a reasonable, honest mistake as to what he was free to do."); Meese & Larkin, supra
note 34, at 726-27 ("The ignorance-of-the-law rule traces its lineage back to Roman law. The
English common law courts adopted the rule, from whence it came to America. In this country, state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as
criminal law treatise writers, have long endorsed that rule. The proposition that ignorance
or mistake of the law is no excuse therefore has an ancient pedigree." (footnotes omitted));
Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 999 (2017)

("[W]hile criminal violations typically carry mens rea requirements that might in principle
make good-faith compliance efforts exculpating, courts have generally rejected wide-ranging
mistake of law defenses even in the criminal context." (footnote omitted)).
57. See Larkin, supra note 56, at 77 ("[O]ver time [defendants' successful use of the mistake
of law defense] would discourage people from learning the law." (footnote omitted)); id. at
105 ("A mistake-of-law rule would create a disincentive to keep abreast of developments in
the law due to the fear that knowledge would sink this defense and, what is worse, would
promote (and shelter) willful blindness. The result would allow phony defenses to perpetuate
themselves. Surely, we want to encourage corporations to know what they may and may not
do, especially given the potential catastrophes that a modern industrial society can wreak
on public health and the environment. A mistake-of-law rule, therefore, would lead to far
more cases of injustice than are created by the no-mistake rule." (footnotes omitted)).
58. See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881) ("It is no doubt true that there are
many cases in which the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law, but
to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by
the larger interests on the other side of the scales."); Kit Kinports, Heien's Mistake of Law,
68 ALA. L. REV. 121, 133 (2016) ("[T]he maxim serves the utilitarian function of providing
an incentive to become familiar with the dictates of the law. Allowing a mistake of law defense, the argument goes, would encourage ignorance . . . and justice to the individual is
rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales.' " (footnote omitted)); Larkin, supra note 56, at 105 ("Defenders of the common law no-mistake rule will
argue . . . that the rule has an added benefit: encouraging people to learn what the law
forbids. Perhaps every individual cannot know every statute, regulation, and judicial decision defining the parameters and content of the penal code, but every person should be en-

couraged to learn those metes and bounds."); Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 755 ("A
third, related justification for the [no-mistake] rule is that it promotes deterrence by encouraging members of the public to make themselves aware of what the law prohibits and facilitates enforcement of the criminal law by disallowing a defense that otherwise could be
widely used." (footnote omitted)).
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for their crimes,59 a result that would work against the retributive,
consequentialist, and expressivist purposes of the criminal justice
system. 60

Third, even if a particular defendant was genuinely ignorant of the
law at the time of her crime, we generally presume that this is her
fault, that she was culpably ignorant.61 (Of course, this presumption
can be rebutted by proof that the defendant is severely mentally ill or
disabled.) While the defendant genuinely did not know that she was
59. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974) ("To require proof of a defendant's knowledge of the legal status of the materials would permit the defendant to avoid
prosecution by simply claiming that he had not brushed up on the law."); Kinports, supra
note 58, at 133 ("[T]he adage is based on the concern that knowledge of the law is not readily
susceptible to proof and fraudulent mistake of law claims are not easily disproven."); Larkin,
supra note 56, at 76-77 ("A second justification for the no-mistake rule rests on the fear that
a mistake-of-law defense would cripple law enforcement. . . . [A] rogue defendant (or his
crafty lawyer) could use a phony mistake-of-law defense to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt
and snooker the jury into an acquittal. . . . A mistake-of-law defense, therefore, could be
widely, repeatedly, and fraudulently used." (footnotes omitted)); Meese & Larkin, supra note
34, at 749 ("The second justification for the ignorance-is-no-excuse rule is expediency. A contrary rule, the argument goes, would place on the prosecution the inordinately difficult burden of showing what knowledge of the law a person had at the time of the charged offense.
In [John] Austin's words, 'if ignorance of the law were a ground of exemption, the administration of justice would be arrested.'" (footnotes omitted)); id. at 752-53 ("A more serious
objection is that allowing a mistake of law defense will cut deeply into the government's
ability to prosecute white-collar offenders for regulatory crimes, such as environmental offenses. . . . The only way to prosecute someone successfully for such crimes, the argument
would go, is to reduce the government's burden by lowering the mental state necessary for
a conviction. Requiring the government to prove willful wrongdoing effectively would render
the environmental laws, for example, incapable of criminal enforcement." (footnotes omitted)); id. at 770 ("It also is not unreasonable to deny a defendant the right to offer a mistake
of law defense when he is charged with a crime that is inherently blameworthy, such as
murder. In that case, the defendant ... is hoping to seat a feckless or civilly disobedient jury,,
and the Constitution guarantees him neither one."); cf. Savoy, supra note 52, at 314 n.196
("Requiring consciousness of wrongdoing for violent crimes would have intolerable legal and
moral consequences for prosecuting individuals generally regarded as some of our most dangerous and evil offenders. For example, terrorists, religious extremists, war criminals, and

other morally committed killers, all of whom act without appreciating the wrongfulness of
their conduct, would fall outside the scope of the criminal law.").
60. See Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325 (2011) ("'These four considerationsretribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation-are the four purposes of sentencing generally, and a court must fashion a sentence 'to achieve the[se] purposes . . . to the
extent that they are applicable' in a given case." (citation omitted)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 183 (1976) ("The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders." (footnote omitted));
Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 753 ("The criminal law expresses the community's condemnation of certain conduct as blameworthy, and that consideration always has been an
important part of the type of antisocial conduct that we label a crime." (footnotes omitted));
Robert L. Misner, Limiting Leon: A Mistake of Law Analogy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
507, 509 (1986) ("A major purpose of the substantive criminal law is to induce external conformity to rules. The purpose of the law is to force compliance with a set of norms. The
criminal law achieves this standard setting function mainly through notions of retribution
and deterrence." (footnotes omitted)).
61. See Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 758 ("[One] justification for the ignoranceis-no-defense rule is that ignorance of the law itself is blameworthy. The failure to learn
where the line is drawn justifies punishing whoever crosses it." (footnotes omitted)).
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committing a crime, she should have known. And this "constructive"
knowledge-this legal knowledge that she easily could have acquired
had she only made the effort-is sufficient for guilt.6 2 So requiring
knowledge of the law for criminal culpability is actually too strong.
Beyond satisfying the elements of the crime itself, a person can still be
culpable even if she did not know the law as long as she had the cognitive ability to acquire this legal knowledge.
Putting the second and third reasons together, ignorance of the
law is generally no excuse because the defendant either knew the law
(and is lying) or did not know the law but should have. Underlying this
disjunction are two assumptions: (a) most defendants know basic
moral principles, and (b) this moral knowledge tends to be an accurate
guide through the criminal law.63
VIII. WHEN IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW CAN EXCUSE

Much like the diminished capacity defense, ignorance of the law is
generally recognized as a valid excuse when it negates the mens rea
required for the crime." Most crimes require either specific intent or
62. See Kinports, supranote 58, at 133 ("[T]he maxim is premised on the idea that 'the
law is definite and knowable,' and everyone it governs has 'the opportunity ... to find out'
what conduct is prohibited." (footnotes omitted)); Larkin, supra note 56, at 76 ("The oldest
rationale [for the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse] is that everyone knows the
criminal law because it grows out of and conforms to the customs, mores, and morals of the

community."); Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 738 ("[E]very person is presumed to know
the law. The rationale for the presumption is that people generally know what the law forbids in whatever jurisdiction they live. Even if they do not, the knowledge is easy to acquire,
so anyone who does not learn what is outlawed is, at least, guilty of negligence." (footnotes
omitted)).
63. See Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 733-34 ("The common law recognized a limited number of crimes. Treason, murder, rape, robbery, larceny in some form, and a small
number of additional offenses were the corpus of the common law of crimes.... [T]his moral
code was called by some 'the rules of natural justice,' which would have been known to all.
The result was that an offense against a neighbor or the king already was a crime against
God. As John Salmond put it: 'The common law is in great part nothing more than common
honesty and common sense. Therefore although a man may be ignorant that he is breaking
the law, he knows very well in most cases that he is breaking the rule of right.' For that
reason, '[i]f not to his knowledge lawless, he is at least dishonest and unjust.' . . . Lastly,
even if mores and ethics did not alert someone to forbidden conduct, a reasonable person
would avoid committing a 'mischievous' act as a matter of common sense." (footnotes omitted)).
64. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); MARY K. THERESE FITZGERALD, 4 SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA
JURISPRUDENCE 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 5:21 (2d ed. 2019); LEWIS R. KATZ ET AL., BALDWIN'S
OHIO PRACTICE OF CRIMINAL LAW § 91:10 (3d ed. 2018); Garvey, supra note 48, at 575 ("Ignorance of the law does excuse. Except when the actor's ignorance can be traced to a prior

breach itself committed with a guilty mind, or when his ignorance itself manifests the ill will
that marks the presence of a guilty mind, ignorance of the law entails the absence of mens
rea."); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 127, 145 (1997) ("When a person makes the kind of error that even a morally virtuous
person could make, then her ignorance of the law should be an excuse.").
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knowledge. Specific intent means a conscious purpose to commit a
particular act or omission, 65 and knowledge means awareness of a
particular fact-either the act itself, a circumstance occasioning the
66
act, or a practically certain consequence of the act. Ignorance of a
particular law will negate either of these-conscious purpose or factual
knowledge-when the purpose or factual knowledge itself requires
some legal knowledge. 67 As a result, it is generally recognized that
mistake of law can be exculpatory or mitigating, sometimes as a
standalone affirmative defense, and other times applicable only to
particular crimes (such as statutory rape). 68
Consider, for example, the crime of receiving stolen property. In
order to commit this crime, one must know that she is receiving stolen
property. 69 This knowledge breaks into two parts: one must know not
only that the property was appropriated from another person but also
that this appropriation was unlawful. And the latter itself requires

65. See Specific Intent, BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) ("The intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with."); Michael M. Blazina, "With
the Intent to Inflict Such Injury": The Courts and the Legislature Create Confusion in California Penal Code Section 12022.7, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 963, 971 (1991) ("[S]cholars have
suggested that the label of specific intent designates that an offense requires the defendant
to possess the mental state of 'purpose.' This approach classifies the varying degrees of intent
according to their definitions. The meaning of specific intent is narrowed to 'purpose' or 'conscious desire' and occupies the top position of this ascending vertical scale of mental culpability." (footnotes omitted)).
66. See Knowledge, BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) ("An awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance .... "); Christopher Slobogin, Experts, Mental States, and
Acts, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1009, 1013 n.17 (2008) ("For many crimes, the mens rea is
knowledge or recklessness, which requires an awareness of the result and circumstances of

the crime." (citation omitted)).
67. See Emily Edwards, But I'm Just a Kid: Juvenile Adjudications and Sentencing
Enhancements, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 216 n.89 (2009) ("At common law, an honest or reasonable mistake of either law or fact may negate a crime's intent or knowledge requirement."
(citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 357 (1972));

Levy, supranote 18, at 242-43 ("Like the mistake of fact defense, one version of the mistake
of law defense states that the defendant is not guilty of a crime because she did not possess
the required mens rea. Specifically, she did not possess the required intent or knowledge."
(footnote omitted)).
68. See United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 444 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[C]ircumstances may arise where a defendant's ignorance of the law may constitute a mitigating
sentencing factor"); United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 965 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[I]gnorance of law may be considered by the court in mitigation of punishment"); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.04(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985); Douglas
Husak, "Broad"CulpabilityAnd The Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 478
(2012) ("Existing law acknowledges the exculpatory significance of ignorance of law .... ");
Douglas Husak, Mistake of Law and Culpability, 4 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 135, 137 (2010) ("[I]gnorance of law is exculpating under various circumstances.").

69. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN., § 16-8-7(a) (2019) ("A person commits the offense of theft
by receiving stolen property when he receives, disposes of, or retains stolen property which
he knows or should know was stolen unless the property is received, disposed of, or retained
with intent to restore it to the owner."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-7(a) (West 2013) ("A person
is guilty of theft if he knowingly receives or brings into this State movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it is probably stolen.").
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basic knowledge of the law of theft. So if the recipient of stolen
property is ignorant of the law of theft, then she cannot be guilty of
this crime.
The obvious response to this example is that any defendant who
claims ignorance of the law of theft is either lying or insane.70
Conversely, we may presume that a defendant charged with receiving
stolen property knew the law of theft at the time of receipt absent
the extraordinary circumstance of severe mental illness or disability.
This much is true given the relative simplicity of the law of theft. But
as criminal laws become more complicated, this presumption of legal
knowledge is correspondingly weakened. Ignorance of these more
complicated laws, which are generally white-collar crimes, can serve
as a valid excuse as long as the defendant can plausibly establish
that her ignorance was both honest (she genuinely did not know or
understand the law) and reasonable (a reasonable person in her
situation might or would not have known or understood the law).71 In

70. See Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 751 ("Anyone who grows up in America today
(or enters from elsewhere) is likely to know that the criminal law prohibits thievery and
homicide. A defendant who claims ignorance of those laws probably should be committed as
insane (or given an award for having world-class chutzpah)" (footnote omitted)).
71. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194-95 (1998) ("Both the tax cases and
Ratzlaf involved highly technical statutes that presented the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct. As a result, we held that these statutes 'carv[e]
out an exception to the traditional rule' that ignorance of the law is no excuse and require
that the defendant have knowledge of the law." (citation and footnotes omitted)); Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1991) ("The proliferation of statutes and regulations
has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent
of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws. Congress has accordingly softened the
impact of the common-law presumption by making specific intent to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses."); FLETCHER, supra note 29, at 731-32 ("Various efforts have been made to defend the principle that even a reasonable mistake of law
should not constitute an excuse for wrongdoing. In the early stages of the criminal law, when
the range of offenses was limited to aggression against particular victims and other obvious
moral wrongs, it was more plausible to assume that everyone knew the law.. . . In a pluralistic society, saddled with criminal sanctions affecting every area of life, one cannot expect
that everyone know what is criminal and what is not."); JEREMY HORDER, EXCUSING CRIME

276 (2004) ("Ignorantiajuris neminem excusat is a maxim perhaps appropriately regarded
as exception-less in a system of criminal law composed wholly or largely of mala in se. But,
a legal system that persists in a belief in the absolute character of that maxim in a world of
ever more far-reaching, ever more technical and specialized, and ever more inaccessible regulatory criminal laws, is a legal system that has simply failed to adapt its moral thinking to
modern circumstances."); John M. Darley et al., The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law,
35 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 165, 181 (2001) ("In our study (holding Texas aside), the citizens
showed no particular knowledge of the laws of their states."); Livingston Hall & Selig J.
Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 646 (1941) ("[N]o one can
know the law, and of course no one does know the law on all points."); Kinports, supra note
58, at 133 ("[T]he maxim has long had its detractors. Some critics have pointed out, quite
persuasively, that its presumption is 'far-fetched' and an 'obvious fiction' because contemporary laws are so numerous, complex, and intricate that the average citizen cannot realisti-

cally be expected to be familiar with all of them." (footnote omitted)); Larkin, supra note 56,
at 78-79 ("[R]egardless of what was true at common law, it no longer is credible to claim
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this way, reasonableness acts as an "anchor." " It helps counter the
slippery-slope argument that, by accepting the mistake of law defense
in at least some situations, jurisdictions will 'open the floodgates' for
defendants seeking to get away with their crimes. 73
that everyone knows the law, particularly since '[t]he tight moral consensus that once supported the criminal law has obviously disappeared.' Those scholars also maintain that it is
fundamentally unfair, and in many cases unconstitutional, to stigmatize and punish (let
alone imprison) morally blameless parties for engaging in conduct that no reasonable person
would have thought a crime. A few in that group are concerned that the proliferation of
criminal statutes has made the penal code arcane, unwieldy, unknowable, and unjust, a

phenomenon colloquially known as 'overcriminalization.' Those critics of the no-mistake rule
believe that the criminal law must evolve in light of the legislative decision to enforce
through the criminal process the increasingly technical and recondite rules promulgated by
the modern regulatory state." (footnotes omitted)); id. at 102 ("[L]awyers and law professors
do not know all of the criminal laws, so it is unreasonable to expect the average layman to
know them." (footnote omitted)); Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 729 ("[T]he criminal
justice system has undergone a complete transformation since the days of Blackstone. Legislatures and courts have made vast changes to the structure of the criminal justice system,
to the officials who comprise that system, and to the procedures that govern how those actors
play their roles. Those developments may have greatly altered the landscape that gave rise
to the common law mistake of law rule-so much so, in fact, that it might no longer make
sense to follow the rule. If so, the courts should own up to the responsibility of 'retiring' it.");
id. at 734 ("The offenses found in federal law today reach far beyond what common sense
and generally accepted moral principles would forbid. There is an ever-increasing number
of crimes that are outside the category of inherently harmful or blameworthy acts .... "); id.
at 738-39 ("As the late-nineteenth-century jurist John Austin wrote, even then the proposition 'that any actual system is so knowable, or that any actual system has ever been so
knowable,' in his colorful words, is 'notoriously and ridiculously false.' In this century,
Jerome Hall described the rule as 'an obvious fiction.' Other critics concluded that 'even
though the ignorance rule may have been justified in the early days of the criminal law in
England,' over time that presumption has become 'indefensible as a statement of fact.' Edwin
Keedy was even less kind; he called the presumption 'absurd.' " (footnotes omitted)); id. at
770 ("[W]hen the accused is charged with a regulatory malum prohibitum offense, his claim
that he made an honest mistake is fully consistent with the purposes that the mens rea
requirement serves and does not offend any constitutional value."); see also Levy, supra note
14, at 243-44 n.34-35.
72. See Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 774 ("[A] mistake of law defense would exculpate only when the defendant's mistake was reasonable. One result of that limitation
would be to render the defense inapplicable as a standalone defense to a crime of violence,
because the average person would know that such conduct is illegal or, at a minimum, questionable." (footnotes omitted)). Still, it is important to note that mere honest (subjective)
ignorance, even if unreasonable,is still sometimes accepted as a legitimate defense. See, e.g.,
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1991) ("In the end, the issue is whether, based
on all the evidence, the Government has proved that the defendant was aware of the duty
at issue, which cannot be true if the jury credits a good-faith misunderstanding and belief
submission, whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable.
... We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals' requirement that a claimed good-faith belief
must be objectively reasonable if it is to be considered as possibly negating the Government's
evidence purporting to show a defendant's awareness of the legal duty at issue.").
73. See Larkin, supra note 56, at 107-08 ("[T]he law excuses errors by police officers,
government employees, and judges only if they are reasonable. A mistake-of-law defense
should have the same limitation. A properly defined mistake-of-law defense would exonerate
a defendant only if he reasonably and honestly believed that the law did not make his conduct a crime. No jury would find that a defendant reasonably and honestly believed that he
could murder, rape, rob, steal, and swindle others. In fact, the laws prohibiting that conduct
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Some courts have determined that reasonableness is satisfied in a
few limited situations 7 4 : when the defendant (a) did not receive fair
notice of the law;75 (b) relied on a law or official statement of law that
is later invalidated;7 " (c) relied on a law or official statement of law that
is ambiguous but later clarified;7 7 or (d) is a police officer. 78 For the
most part, only these four situations have been thought to make the
defendant's legal ignorance reasonable.
The first three exceptions to the general ignorance-of-the-law-is-noexcuse maxim are a great start.79 (By contrast, the fourth exception,
recently endorsed by the Supreme Court in Heien v. North Carolina,
is highly problematic. 80 ) But several more exceptions need to be added.
are so deeply entrenched into American mores that no judge or jury could find such a claim
credible. As a result, a trial judge would not be obliged even to instruct the jury on that
defense in such a case. A 'reasonableness' requirement would go a long way toward cutting
off fraudulent use of a mistake-of-law defense." (footnotes omitted)).
74. See KATHRYN CHRISTOPHER & RUSSELL CHRISTOPHER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL
PROBLEMS AND OUTSTANDING ANSWERS 47 (2012) ("Three principal exceptions to the general

rule [denying mistake of law defenses] have emerged: (i) reasonable reliance on an official
statement of law that is afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, (ii) ignorance or
mistake of law that negates the mens rea of the charged offense, and (iii) lack of fair notice.").
75. See Lambert v. California,355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) ("The rule that 'ignorance of the
law will not excuse' is deep in our law .... On the other hand, due process places some limits
on its exercise. Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice. Notice
is sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend charges. Notice is required
before property interests are disturbed, before assessments are made, before penalties are
assessed. Notice is required in a myriad of situations where a penalty or forfeiture might be
suffered for mere failure to act." (citations omitted)); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(a) (AM.
LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985); BALDWIN'S OH. PRAC. CRIM. L. §
91:10 (3d ed. 2018); Larkin, supra note 45, at 113 ("[T]he mistake-of-law defense also serves
the purpose of ensuring that the criminal law affords parties adequate notice of what the
law forbids.").
76. See, e.g., State v. Guice, 621 A.2d 553, 557 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) ("[W]hen
individuals rely on an official but erroneous representation of law they cannot be expected
to know the law is otherwise, and thus can have no notice or fair warning of what the law
actually requires or proscribes." (citation omitted)); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (AM.
LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985); 1 FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK:

CRIMINAL § 12:38 (4th ed. 2018); BALDWIN'S OH. PRAC. CRIM. L. § 91:10 (3d ed. 2018); 21
TEX. JR. 3D CRIMINAL LAW: DEFENSES § 91 (2019).

77. This is basically the rule of lenity: "The judicial doctrine holding that a court, in
construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment." Rule of Lenity, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see, e.g., 24 TEX. JUR. 3D CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE: TRIAL § 429 (2019).
78. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 55 (2014).
79. Indeed, some or all of the first three exceptions might even be constitutionally required. See Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 765, 768-69.
80. See also United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) ("We
also note the fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to 'the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse,' while allowing those 'entrusted to enforce' the law to be ignorant of it." (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 196 (1998))). See generally Madison
Coburn, The Supreme Court's Mistake on Law Enforcement Mistake of Law: Why States
Should Not Adopt Heien v. North Carolina, 6 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 503, 503 (2016);
Kinports, supra note 58, at 122; Larkin, supra note 56, at 72 (complaining that the law is
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8
In other words, the mistake of law defense needs to be expanded.
Again, given that the ignorance in all cases must be reasonable, we
need not worry that such expansion will suddenly open the floodgates
to thousands of bogus mistake of law claims.

IX. PROPOSAL FOR A BROADER MISTAKE
OF LAW DEFENSE

The first exception that should be added: the defendant lacked
the cognitive capacity to know or understand the law. Normative
ignorance is generally covered by the insanity defense. But four
states-Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Utah-have abolished it. So
defendants in those four states who lack the cognitive capacity to know
or understand the law have no defense. This omission constitutes a
violation of their constitutional right to due process and, if they are
convicted and punished, their constitutional right against cruel and
unusual punishment.8 2
By folding the insanity defense into the mistake of law defense,,
a state would effectively "re-brand" it. This incorporation would be
perfectly appropriate because what is exculpatory about insanity is
not merely severe mental illness or disability per se but also what this
severe mental illness or disability causes: ignorance of the law. Fortysix states capture this essential feature of the insanity defense, which
tends to be overshadowed by the causal element (again, mental illness
or disability).
Importantly, if any states followed my suggestion here to
incorporate the insanity defense into their mistake of law defense,
much more forgiving to "law enforcement officers, prosecutors, or judges [who] make mistakes" than to "private parties"); id. at 103 ("[T]here is an obvious tension between the propositions that (1) every private party knows every criminal law in whatever form it may take,
and (2) no law enforcement officer can be expected to know all of the laws governing his
job."); Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 772 ("A person should not be convicted, let alone
go to prison, for making a reasonable mistake. If we are willing to pardon the unavoidable
flaws of the people who enforce our laws, we should be willing to extend the same grace to
the remainder of the people, who suffer from the same shortcomings."); Eang L. Ngov, Police
Ignorance and Mistake of Law Under the Fourth Amendment, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 165,
165 (2018).
81. See Larkin, supra note 56, at 114 ("[T]he proper remedy is to grant private parties
the same forgiveness that we already afford government officials. The reasonable-mistake,
qualified-immunity, and harmless-error doctrines serve important social goals. The law is
sounder today than it was before the Supreme Court created those doctrines. We do not need
to scuttle any one of them, and we should not take that step. The soundest remedy is simply
to recognize that private parties deserve the same mercy that our government officials already enjoy."). Meese and Larkin propose an exception that I will not consider here:
There also is a case where the decision to apply a mistake of law defense should be easy to
recognize: namely, to the charge that a person has violated the law of a foreign country. In
that case, refusing to allow a defendant to raise a mistake of law defense is utterly irrational,
so irrational, in fact, that the refusal clearly should be held unconstitutional.
Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 775.

82.

See infra Part III.
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they should also include a provision requiring automatic civil
commitment for defendants who are acquitted on this basis. This
provision is necessary for two reasons. First, public safety. If a
defendant commits a crime, especially a violent crime, as a result
of mental-illness or disability-induced normative ignorance, he
constitutes a danger to society unless and until his mental illness
is successfully treated. Second, public approval. For public safety
reasons, insanity statutes include provisions establishing postacquittal commitment procedures. 8
Without requiring postacquittal commitment, insanity acquittees might be prematurely
released, and such early release would pose a danger both to the
acquittee himself and to the larger community. 4 There is no good
reason, then, why a mistake of law statute that incorporates the
insanity defense should not also require the same post-acquittal
commitment procedures.
The second exception that should be added: the defendant lacked
a reasonable opportunity to learn the law. Generally, this opportunity
is thought to be satisfied if the government publishes its criminal
laws. 85 The government need not also make sure that every citizen
takes advantage of this opportunity and absorbs this information;
that obligation falls on each individual citizen. But even if the state
has published a particular law, L, the defendant lacks the opportunity
to learn L when something outside her control in effect blocks her
from accessing this publication. If the state deliberately or negligently
fails to make a given law accessible to a particular person (for example,
a prisoner), and if she proceeds to violate L, she probably has a

.

83. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4243 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.5 (West 1994); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 99-13-7 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1321 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C268.1 (2019).
84. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 347 (1997) ("[P]otentially indefinite duration [of confinement of the dangerously mentally ill] is linked, not to any punitive objective,
but to the purpose of holding a person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to
be a threat to others."); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992) (" 'The committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous,' .
. i.e., the acquittee may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no
longer." (quoting and citing Jones v. U.S., 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983)).
85. But see Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 742-43 ("The promulgation of imple-

menting regulations can lead to an avalanche of positive criminal laws in one form or an-

other. That approach . . . ill serves the interests of regulated parties, who need clearly understandable rules defining criminal liability in order to avoid winding up in the hoosegow.
Worse still is the prospect that the government has interpreted its regulations in nonpublic
guidance documents that, in effect, create 'secret law.' " (footnotes omitted)); id. at 747-48
("Worse still than the fact that the federal criminal code is generally unruly and incoherent
is the fact that the penal code no longer can be said to give the average person notice of what
the law prohibits. . . . We are gradually heading toward the prospect that everything not
expressly permitted is forbidden, as was said of the former Soviet Union. If so, everyone can
be charged with some crime regardless of the effort that he or she makes to learn where the
line is drawn and to stay far away from it. Pushing the presumption of knowledge of the law
to reach every nook and cranny of today's penal code would lead to an unsound and irrational

result." (footnotes omitted)).
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valid mistake of law claim. Still, arguably, lack of opportunity is
not sufficient to establish that the ignorance was reasonable. The
defendant must also establish that L was too difficult or complicated
to be "guessable"-that is, knowable or presumable through pure
moral intuition. 86
The third exception that should be added: the defendant reasonably
but mistakenly inferred from widely accepted norms or ethics that
her conduct was lawful.8 7 This kind of situation might occur when
two conditions converge: the individual is not legally sophisticated,
and the law is complicated, unsettled, or varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
Suppose, for example, the following:
1. After overhearing two business executives talking
loudly at a restaurant about a tender offer, Clyde
traded on the companies and made a killing.
2. Clyde honestly believed that he was not doing
anything morally wrong for two reasons. First, he
had a right to be where he was, the executives were
speaking loudly in his presence, and overhearing
loud conversations is very common in modern society
(especially with the ubiquity of cell phones). Second,
his eavesdropping was at least partly involuntary.
He could not help overhearing them, and he was not at
all obligated to change his location for this (or any
other) reason.

86. See Larkin, supra note 56, at 106 ("A mistake-of-law defense seeks to enable morally blameless individuals honestly trying to comply with the law from being convicted and
punished for actions that no reasonable person would know to be a crime without having a
lawyer at his elbow. The average person does not have the luxury of such readily available
legal advice. . . . The law must be clear to 'men of common intelligence'-not lawyers of common intelligence-in order for it to be valid. The law assumes that the average person lacks
legal training. By contrast, some corporations have large legal departments staffed with
lawyers who can offer advice if and whenever the company needs it. Individuals need a mistake-of-law defense. Corporations may not." (footnotes omitted)); Meese & Larkin, supra

note 34, at 747 ("Blameworthiness used to serve as a criterion that distinguished those who
were evil-minded from those who were morally innocent, or just negligent. But we no longer
can rely on the legislature to draw that line.").

87 See Meese & Larkin, supranote 34, at 762 ("The rationale underlying ... [the voidfor-vagueness] doctrine is that the government must supply everyone with 'fair notice' of
forbidden conduct before someone can be criminally punished for having committed it. That
rationale applies equally to the person who, acting in good faith and consistent with contemporary mores, is unaware that his conduct is unlawful. He, too, has little or no opportunity
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the criminal law; in fact, that is precisely what
he thought he was doing. Yet, he was mistaken because the law has moved so far beyond
what an average person reasonably can be deemed to know that it becomes unreasonable to
attribute to him knowledge of where the law has wound up.").
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3. Clyde inferred from his beliefs in (2) above that his
trading on the information he overheard was perfectly
legal.
4. According to 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3, 88 trading on
material nonpublic information in the context of
tender offers, even as a "remote tippee," qualifies as
insider trading and therefore as a form of securities
fraud.89
Given (1) through (4), should Clyde be prosecuted for, and convicted
of, insider trading? The answer mostly depends on whether Clyde's
erroneous belief in the legality of trading on material nonpublic
information gleaned not through any obviously illegal means or inside
connections but rather through pure serendipity, simply being in the
right place at the right time, was reasonable. And the arguments
can cut either way.
On the one hand, it might be argued that Clyde's belief in the
legality of his conduct-trading on material nonpublic information
that he accidentally overheard-was not reasonable given society's
belief that insider trading is obviously unfair. On the other hand,
it might be argued that his belief in the legality of his conduct
was reasonable given that not all (seemingly) immoral conduct is
illegal-for example, gossiping or lying (in most circumstances).

88. The statute reads in relevant part:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced, a
tender offer (the 'offering person'), it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in
possession of material information relating to such tender offer which information he knows
or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has been
acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the
offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of
such securities or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or

any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a
reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly

disclosed by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1982).
89. See Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 181, 191
(2005/2006) (The SEC "adopted Rule 14e-3 in the tender offer context to preclude trading
securities of an acquiring company or a target company on the basis of material, non-public
information that the trader knew or had reason to know came from either company." (foot-

notes omitted)); Thomas Lee Hazen, 'Insider Trading'UnderRule 10b-5, SC20 ALI-ABA 377,
382-83 (1997) ("[F]ollowing the [decision in Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980)], the SEC
adopted Rule 14e-3 which makes it unlawful for anyone other than the tender offeror who
has knowledge of a planned tender offer to trade on that information. Rule 14e-3 is not based
upon misappropriation but rather upon possession of nonpublic material information.").
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Morality, after all, is largely subjective. 90 So it would be both foolish
and arrogant for any one person to think that the law perfectly tracks
his own particular moral beliefs. Conversely, then, it would be equally
foolish-and unfair-for the criminal justice system to expect people
to rely entirely on their moral beliefs, which (again) differ from person
to person, to determine what does and does not qualify as a crime in
their jurisdiction.
While both arguments are compelling, the latter is slightly
stronger than the former. Reasonable belief is a tricky concept, both
in terms of meaning and application.9 1 This is why we have courts;
we need judges and juries, maximally objective third parties, to
make this determination. Some factfinders will lean in one direction
(reasonable), some in the other direction (unreasonable). Either
way, the judgment must be made; it does not mechanistically follow
from a combination of the facts and the law. If it did, if Clyde's
ignorance were automatically deemed to be unreasonable no matter
what the circumstances, then insider-trading laws would effectively
become strict liability crimes.
Now, strict liability is not out of the question. Both the federal,
government and the states recognize strict liability for regulatory

90. See Alina Ng Boyte, Picking at Morals: Analytical Jurisprudencein the Age of Naturalized Ethics, 26 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 493, 496-97 (2017) ("[B]ranches of the natural
sciences, such as cognitive science, suggest that moral decisions and moral actions are
simply manifestations of our emotional frames and that these emotions, which give rise to
moral decisions and moral actions, do not necessarily track objective aspects of reality. Our
.

moral reactions are rather emotional predispositions to various situations that confront us

If moral decisions and moral actions are a product of our subjective emotional states,
...
morality as a whole lacks objective truth and would therefore be unique to communities,
socially constructed, and produce pluralistic societies." (footnote omitted)); Patrick N. Leduc,
Christianityand the Framers: The True Intent of the Establishment Clause, 5 LIBERTY U. L.

REV. 201, 250 (2011) ("With the rise of secularism, assisted by court decisions that promoted
neutrality at the expense of religious expression, there has been an increasing belief that all
morality is a subjective value. This view of subjective morality holds that moral issues should
not and cannot be imposed by government, as all views and actions have equal value and
claim.").

91. Eric Citron, Sentencing Review: Judgment, Justice, and the Judiciary, 115 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 150, 150 (2006) ("[W]ith circuit courts hesitant to destroy old paradigms
or dive into new ones, the criteria for reasonableness have remained elusive to say the
least."); Christian M. Halliburton, Race, Brain Science, and CriticalDecision-Makingin the
Context of Constitutional CriminalProcedure, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 319, 334 (2011/2012) ("Reasonableness is an elusive concept, combining both subjective and objective elements that are
measured against the specifics of the particular encounter.").
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offenses and some torts.9 2 But, with very few exceptions, 3 strict
liability is frowned upon in criminal law. 4 And for good reasoncriminal convictions bring the most serious consequences: stigma, loss
of reputation, hefty fines, imprisonment, and sometimes even death.
So, if justice and fairness are to be maximized, culpability must be
established. In order to establish culpability, mens rea must be
established. And, as I have argued in this article, in order to establish
mens rea, the defendant's knowledge of the relevant law must be
established. This chain of reasoning helps to explain why honest and
reasonable ignorance of the law should be recognized as a powerful
excuse.

One big exception to the no-strict-liability-in-criminal-law principle
is statutory rape. Over thirty states (and the federal government) do

92. Lena E. Smith, Is Strict Liability the Answer in the Battle Against Foreign Corporate Bribery?, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1801, 1827-28 (2014) ("In the U.S., the strict liability penalty scheme is typically found in certain criminal offenses, civil public welfare offenses, products liability, and tortious conduct involving ultrahazardous activities."). But see Garvey,
supra note 48, at 548-49 ("No state's authority is without limit. One such limit disables a
state from rendering criminally liable those who choose to cp but who do so without a guilty
mind. A legitimate state has permission to punish those who choose to <p with a guilty mind,
but enjoys no such permission with respect to those who choose to (pwithout a guilty mind."
(footnotes omitted)). Garvey's quotation here is descriptively inaccurate and normatively
radical. It basically implies either that there are no strict liability crimes (or negligence
crimes or possibly even recklessness crimes), which is contrary to fact, or that there should
not be such crimes, which is contrary to common practice and common wisdom.
93. One such exception is knowledge of a certain circumstance. For example, many bigamy statutes require knowledge that one is already married. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 25.01 (West 2019) ("(a) An individual commits an offense if . . (2) he knows that a
married person other than his spouse is married ... "); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02
cmt. 11 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) ("Claim of right is a
defense because . . . the defendant must have culpable awareness of [the fact that the property belongs to someone else] - . . . [T]he legal element involved is simply an aspect of the
attendant circumstances, with respect to which knowledge, recklessness, or negligence, as
the case may be, is required for culpability .... "). But see United States v. Feola, 420 U.S.
671, 684 (1975) ("We conclude . . . that in order to effectuate the congressional purpose of
according maximum protection to federal officers by making prosecution for assaults upon

them cognizable in the federal courts, [18 U.S.C.A.] § 111 cannot be construed as embodying
an unexpressed requirement that an assailant be aware that his victim is a federal officer.");
id. at 693 ("[F]or the purpose of individual guilt or innocence, awareness of the official identity of the assault victim is irrelevant. We would expect the same to obtain with respect to
the conspiracy offense .... ").
94. But see United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 676 (1975) (holding that corporate superiors can be found criminally liable for subordinates' crimes even if the former did not
commit any wrongdoing, conscious or negligent); Larkin, supra note 45, at 80 ("There has
been a proliferation of regulatory laws backed up by criminal penalties in the last 40 years.");
Meese & Larkin, supra note 34, at 744-45 ("[T]he 'knowledge' necessary to establish a violation [of some environmental laws] can be imputed to a person from the knowledge of others

in his company. As far as the necessary criminal acts go, a person can be held liable not only
for his own actions, but also for the conduct of others under his supervision because of his
position in the company." (footnotes omitted)).
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not recognize mistake of age as a defense for at least some of their
statutory rape offenses. 95 The main reason for this exceptional policy:
to protect children from sexual assault. 96
Of course, homicide statutes are also designed in part to protect
children. But the reason that many jurisdictions drop the mens
rea element only for statutory rape and not for homicide is probably
because they believe that the mistake of fact defense for statutory
rape will lead to many more unjust acquittals. The idea, which is not
implausible, is that many male jurors will at least empathize with, and
possibly even envy, defendants who engaged in sexual relations with
females at or above what they (the male jurors) take to be a "normal"
age for beginning sexual relations, somewhere between 14 and 17.97
Still, the risk of unjust acquittals is not a sufficiently good reason
to make statutory rape a strict liability crime. First, many states
already permit a mistake of age defense for some kinds of statutory
rape (such as when the adult is only two or three years older than the
victim), 98 and there is no evidence that these states have undergone a

95. See Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionalityof Strict Liability in Sex Offender
RegistrationLaws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 317 (2006).
96. See Vicki J. Bejma, Protective Cruelty: State v. Yanez and Strict Liability as to Age
in Statutory Rape, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 499, 501 (2000) ("[M]any still insist that
the imposition of strict liability as to age in statutory rape and child molestation is a protective cruelty, necessary to protect children and youths from sexual exploitation." (footnote
omitted)); Genevieve Pecharka, Knowledge of Age Is Irrelevant When the Defendant.Is
Charged with Solicitation to Commit an Act Constituting a Strict Liability Crime: Commonwealth v. Hacker, 3 DUQ. CRIM. L.J. 1, 10 (2013) ("[T]he purpose of allowing strict liability
for statutory rape is also to prevent an assailant from taking advantage of a mentally and

physically inferior person, then avoiding culpability by claiming lack of knowledge."); Ranak
K. Jasani, Note, Graves v. State: Undermining Legislative Intent: Allowing Sexually Violent
Repeat Offenders to Avoid Enhanced RegistrationRequirements Under Maryland'sRegistration of Offenders Statute, 61 MD. L. REV. 739, 757 (2002) (noting that "the traditional view
of statutory rape" is " 'a strict liability crime designed to protect young persons from the
dangers of sexual exploitation by adults, loss of chastity, physical injury, and in the case of
girls, pregnancy.' " (citation omitted)). Two other reasons, general deterrence and judicial
efficiency, are not sufficient; if they were, then-because these justifications could be applied
to all other crimes-we would have to abandon the mens-rea requirement entirely, which is
absurd. Mens rea is generally required for culpability, and culpability is always required for
just punishment.

97. I thank Raff Donelson for this point. Another possible explanation, though not a
justification, for applying strict liability only to statutory rape and not to homicide is the
archaic sexist notion that females need to remain virginal or "pure" until they have reached

adulthood. (I thank Katie Stauss for this insight.) Of course, this explanation fails to account
for the fact that statutory rape statutes are generally gender-neutral and so equally apply
to male victims. But if this explanation is correct, then we should expect to find that, in
practice, many more defendants are prosecuted and convicted for engaging in sexual relations with underage girls than for engaging in sexual relations with underage boys.
98. See generally Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or lack of information as to victim's age as defense to statutory rape, 46 A.L.R. 5th 499 (1997).
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resulting spike in this type of crime. 99 Second, even if they did, this
consequence would still not be a very good argument against provision
of the mistake of age defense, which fundamental fairness requires.
Instead, it would be a good argument for strengthening prosecutorial
responses to this defense.
X.

OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES

The most powerful objection against my proposal that the insanity
defense is a species of the mistake of law defense would show that
there are situations in which the insanity defense applies, but the
mistake of law defense does not. Even just one example would be
sufficient to show that they are two different defenses and therefore
need to remain separate. In this Part, I will offer two such examples.
My conclusions in both cases, however, will be that neither situation
really requires the insanity defense per se after all.
Objection #1: At the time of his crime, Clyde knew that he was
committing a crime but could not control his behavior as a result of
his mental illness. Because Clyde's problem here is not cognitive
impairment but rather volitional impairment, the insanity defense
would seem to be more applicable than the mistake of law defense.
In response to Objection #1, it is certainly true that the MPC
version of the insanity defense would more likely help the defendant
than would the mistake of law defense because it excuses "criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity . . . to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law." 100 Still, there are many jurisdictions
that recognize the insanity defense but not the MPC version of it.
Instead, they have adopted the M'Naghten version, which covers
only cognitive impairment, not volitional impairment.10 1 And few
would argue that their failure to cover volitional impairment is

99. See Fleming v. State, 455 S.W.3d 577, 612-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ("Some courts
have said that recognizing a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense would 'considerably diminish[ ]' the deterrent effect of child-sex-offense statutes, but such conclusions appear to be
mere speculation. .. [T]wenty states have some form of mistake-of-age defense, and I am
unaware of any evidence that those states have a higher incidence of child sex offenses, or a
significantly lower incidence of successful prosecutions, than states that provide no such
defense." (citations omitted)); Patricia O'Neill, CriminalLaw: Jury Instructions-MistakeOf
Fact In Rape Cases, 86 MASS. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 69 (2001) ("A mistake of fact defense would
not . . . increase the risk of the harm done by a sexual assault.").
100. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
101. See supra Part III.
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unconstitutional.1 0 2 So it is difficult to see why the mistake of law
defense, as a replacement for the insanity defense, would itself have
to cover volitional impairment.
While it may seem unfortunate that most M'Naghten jurisdictions
do not consider volitional impairment to qualify for the insanity
defense, defendants in these jurisdictions-as well as in all other
jurisdictions-still have some decent options. First, they may argue
that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
their act was voluntary, which is an element of every crime. Second,
some defendants may try to establish not a merely a sporadic loss of
control but rather a deeper condition, automatism, which says that
their body periodically goes into "automatic pilot" and is therefore no
more in their control than the bodily motions of a sleepwalker. 103
Objection #2: Suppose that the defendant's mental illness caused
his legal ignorance but was not of a kind or degree that made his
legal ignorance unavoidable. In this situation, the mistake of law
defense would not work because the defendant's legal ignorance
was unreasonable; a reasonable person in his situation, including
his mental illness, would have learned the law and complied with
it. But the insanity defense still might work because, ex hypothesi,
the defendant's legal ignorance was indeed caused by his mental
illness. Therefore the mistake of law defense cannot adequately
substitute for the insanity defense.
In response to Objection #2, the assumption that the insanity
defense might work in this situation is simply false. The insanity
defense does not apply if the defendant could have overcome his

102. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801 (1952) ("[T]he progress of science has not
reached a point where its learning would compel us to require the states to eliminate the
right and wrong test from their criminal law. ... [I]t is clear that adoption of the irresistible
impulse test is not 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" (footnotes omitted)); see also
LEVY, supra note 10, at 61 ("Because capacities cannot be measured in discrete quantities
like pounds and inches, we cannot precisely quantify these thresholds or precisely determine
if any particular person whose responsibility we question falls below them. It is for this reason-our inability to precisely measure or fathom threshold capacities, especially controlthat some scholars, such as Stephen Morse, argue that the insanity defense should not contain a volitional prong. In other words, we should not allow for the possibility that some
defendants might be acquitted on the purported grounds that they fall beneath the volitional
threshold required for responsibility as a result of mental illness or disability." (endnotes
omitted)).
103. See generally Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Automatism or Unconsciousness
as Defense to Criminal Charge, 27 A.L.R. 4th 1067 (1984); Mingzhao Xu, Sexsomnia: A Valid
Defense to Sexual Assault?, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 687, 687-88 (2009) ("A successful
defense of automatism or unconsciousness completely relieves the defendant of liability on
the basis that he or she has not committed a voluntary act and/or lacked the mens rea to
commit the crime." (footnote omitted)).
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mental illness or disability and figured out the law.1 0 4 Instead, the
mental illness or disability must be so debilitatingthat the defendant
could not have learned the law.
What applies to the insanity defense here applies equally to the
mistake of law defense. My thesis that the mistake of law defense
can serve as an adequate substitute for the insanity defense
assumes that it shares the same threshold for severe mental illness
or disability. If a mentally ill or disabled defendant crosses this
threshold, then she qualifies for the mistake of law defense, just as
she would have qualified for the insanity defense. But if she does
not cross this threshold-that is, if her illness or disability is not
so severe that it undermines her cognitive capacity to acquire basic
legal knowledge-then she is at least somewhat responsible for her
failure to do so. Her mental illness or disability is not so debilitating
that it completely negates this alternative possibility and, with it, her
responsibility for failing to pursue this alternative possibility. At best,
her mental illness or disability is a mitigating factor, not (like insanity)
a full excuse.
This mitigating-factor defense goes by different names. As
discussed above, one such name is "diminished capacity." The
other names are "diminished responsibility," "extreme emotional
disturbance," and "partial insanity."1 05 But whatever term is used,
this is generally the kind of defense that the defendant in Objection
#2 would need. Just as with Objection #1, she would not need the
insanity defense.

104. The one exception to this point is the Durham Rule, which says that the insanity
defense applies as long as the defendant's criminal conduct was caused by her mental illness
or disability, whatever its nature or severity. But only one jurisdiction, New Hampshire, still
follows the Durham Rule, and even this jurisdiction follows it only in name, not in substance.
See LEVY, supranote 10, at 113.
105. See State v. Doyon, 416 A.2d 130, 134 (R.I. 1980) ("Sometimes [the defense of diminished capacity] . . . is called 'partial responsibility,' 'diminished responsibility,' 'diminished capacity,' 'partial insanity,' 'diminished capacity through diminished responsibility,'
or 'limited capacity.'" (citing Travis H.D. Lewin, PsychiatricEvidence In CriminalCases For
Purposes Other Than The Defense Of Insanity, 26 SYRAcUSE L. REV. 1051, 1052 n.8, 105465 (1975)); Paul H. Robinson et al., Annotation, Murder-Provocation/extremeemotional

disturbance, 1 CRIM. L. DEF. § 102(d) (2019) ("The defenses of extreme emotional disturbance
and diminished capacity (as a form of partial insanity, as described in § 101(c)) are functionally similar in that both serve to reduce murder to manslaughter."). But see id. ('Generally,
however, [extreme emotional disturbance and diminished capacity] ... present very distinct
defenses. Extreme emotional disturbance applies to mentally healthy, normal persons who
kill in part due to special circumstances causing the emotional disturbance. Diminished capacity, on the other hand, applies to mentally abnormal persons. It is designed to take account of persons who are not sufficiently insane to merit a complete insanity defense, but
who suffer from sufficient incapacity to merit mitigation in the degree of blameworthiness
assigned to them." (citations omitted)).
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CONCLUSION

My goal in this article has been to establish three main points.
The first point is that the fifty states are constitutionally required to
provide defendants with the opportunity to plead the insanity defense.
So, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Utah-all of which abolished
their insanity defenses long ago-are violating the Constitution.
Specifically, they have been depriving many defendants of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and, when they are convicted
and punished, violating their Eighth Amendment right against cruel
and unusual punishment.
The second point is that these four states-and any other state that
might abolish the insanity defense in the future-may remedy this
constitutional violation by providing defendants with a mistake of law
defense that explicitly exculpates normative ignorance due to severe
mental illness. To date, the mistake of law defense and the insanity
defense have been regarded as entirely separate and unrelated. I hope
to have shown that this common understanding is mistaken. The two
defenses significantly intersect. Both excuse on the basis of normative
ignorance-that is, ignorance of the law or the moral basis of the
law. If I am right that the insanity defense is indeed constitutionally
required, then even states that have abolished it will be fulfilling
their constitutional obligations if they provide for a sufficiently broad
mistake of law defense.
The third point is that not only Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Utah
but also the other forty-six states should expand their mistake of law
defense in two other ways as well. First, all states should add lack of
a reasonable opportunity to learn the law, a lack that is generally
caused by factors outside the individual's control, such as government
interference or ineptitude. Second, all states should add a reasonable
but mistaken inference from widely accepted norms or ethics that
one's conduct is lawful. I used the example of remote tippees, but there
are plenty of other malum prohibitum crimes out there, especially
complicated white-collar crimes, that would qualify as well. Because
they cannot be divined simply through moral intuition, and because
not everybody can afford quality legal advice, justice requires that we
extend the mistake of law defense to these hapless souls as well.
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